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According to the political business cycle literature, survival-maximizing leaders will manipulate whatever macroeconomic
policy instruments they have at their disposal in order to retain power. However, an obvious implication of the political
business cycle literature has not previously been adequately tested: does having the ability to manipulate macroeconomic
policy instruments actually allow leaders to stay in office longer? We argue that elected leaders who have neither fiscal
nor monetary instruments available for electoral purposes will find it more difficult to survive in office. We test this claim
using data from 19 OECD countries in the latter part of the twentieth century when the degree of capital mobility in the
international economy was high. We find that access to macroeconomic instruments does help leaders retain office, but
that these instruments are only effective for leaders who have been in office for at least 7 years.
The existence of political business cycles (PBC)—the
short-term manipulation of the economy by survival-
seeking leaders for the sole purpose of political gain,
even if that gain comes with long-term economic conse-
quences—has been long studied by scholars (Nordhaus
1975; MacRae 1977; Tufte 1978; Keech 1995). The idea
of PBCs is intuitive (survival-maximizing politicians stim-
ulate the economy just prior to an election because
retrospective voters will reward them for doing so even
if such stimulus increases inflation and, therefore,
reduces real wages), but an obvious implication of the
PBC literature has not been adequately tested: does hav-
ing the ability to induce a PBC actually help leaders survive?
The fact that this question has received little attention
is surprising, given that, at the end of the day, enhanc-
ing political survival is the entire point of inducing a
PBC.
Addressing this question requires keeping in mind
that PBCs are context specific (Clark 2003). In particu-
lar, the high degree of capital mobility in the interna-
tional economy since the late 1970s means that the
choice of exchange rate regime has a substantial
impact on the ability of leaders to use fiscal and mone-
tary levers to manipulate the economy. In democracies
where financial capital is free to enter and exit the
country, leaders can engage in monetary expansions
prior to elections if the exchange rate is flexible and
the central bank is not independent. Leaders can
engage in fiscal expansions prior to elections if the
exchange rate is fixed (Clark and Hallerberg 2000). If,
however, the exchange rate is flexible and the central
bank is independent, elected leaders will have neither
fiscal nor monetary instruments available for electoral
purposes. Indeed, Clark (2003) finds that when con-
text-dependent, electorally motivated manipulations of
monetary and fiscal policy occur, they produce expan-
sions in national income and reductions in unemploy-
ment in pre-electoral periods.
We should not assume that governments face identical
incentives to manipulate the economy at each election,
however. Instead, as Schultz argues, ‘‘incentives for govern-
ments to engineer economic cycles can vary greatly from
one election to the next depending upon their political
needs at the time’’ (Schultz 1995:81). For instance, if the
government goes into the election relatively sure that it will
be re-elected, then it has substantially less incentive to
manipulate the economy than when it faces much tougher
prospects of re-election. Moreover, the government should
want to manipulate the economy only when necessary since,
according to Schultz, by potentially damaging the economy
after the very short term, the leader can harm the governing
party’s reputation down the road.
If we accept that PBCs do occur in some contexts, then
the question is whether leaders who find themselves in such
contexts are able to stay in office longer than would other-
wise be the case. This is an open question at present. One
study that has considered the impact of monetary institu-
tions on political survival is Bernhard and Leblang (2002).
However, because they are interested in how different mon-
etary institutions help government coalition partners miti-
gate intra- and inter-party conflicts, not in how different
monetary institutions influence the length of time a leader
stays in office, they do not focus on the length of time a par-
ticular government or prime ministerial party remains in
power. Instead, Bernhard and Leblang (2002) seek to
explain the proportion of the maximum electoral term
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available that a cabinet fulfills.1 Thus, it is not clear that
the Bernhard and Leblang analysis explains political
survival as we conceptualize it in this paper. Indeed, a recent
study has shown that the percentage of the potential
term that a government fulfills is not a good proxy for the
length of time a cabinet stays in office (Conrad and Golder
2010).
In contrast, we seek to evaluate how monetary institu-
tions affect the amount of time a leader remains in
office. The importance of evaluating the survival of lead-
ers is becoming more prevalent in political science, and
in this respect, we follow recent literature such as Brown-
lee (2009), McGillivray and Smith (2008), Chiozza and
Goemans (2004) and Bienen and van de Walle (1991).
We evaluate leader tenure by considering when a leader
experiences political death, which we define as removal
from office that meets one of three conditions: (i) the
leader resigns or retires for any reason other than declin-
ing health; (ii) the leader loses a general election; or (iii)
the leader is term limited, but that leader’s party loses
office in the terminal election.
The next section briefly reviews the theory of context-
specific macroeconomic policy manipulation. We develop
the hypothesis that leaders who possess instruments with
which to engineer pre-electoral macroeconomic expan-
sions should survive longer in office than those who do
not. Recognizing that the need to manipulate macroeco-
nomic policy is context dependent, we also discuss the
proposed mechanism that links possible leader survival to
monetary institutions, hypothesizing that leaders presid-
ing over slower growth rates are more likely to be
removed from office than other leaders. The third sec-
tion describes our research design and data. We test our
hypothesis using data from 19 OECD countries from
1972 to 1999, including original data that we collected
on the reasons for leader removal. The fourth section
presents our model and results. Consistent with our
expectations, we find that having control of macroeco-
nomic policy tools enhances leader survival, though,
somewhat surprisingly, we find that these tools only help
survival for long-serving leaders. Specifically, we find that
these instruments are only effective for leaders who have
been in office for at least 7 years. In the fifth section, we
discuss links to other literatures that might offer an
explanation for this surprising finding.
Monetary Institutions, Economic Policy, and Leader
Survival
Standard open economy macroeconomic theory is rela-
tively straightforward. Absent capital mobility, both mone-
tary policy and fiscal policy can be used to affect national
income. After capital mobility is introduced, monetary
policy is effective only when the exchange rate is allowed
to fluctuate, and fiscal policy is effective only when the
exchange rate is fixed (Mundell 1963). Consequently, in
the absence of capital mobility, incumbents have two
macroeconomic policy instruments at their disposal, but
with capital mobility they are forced to choose between
fiscal and monetary instruments.
Central bank independence adds a further complication
for incumbents. Assuming central bankers and incumbents
differ in their policy preferences, the independent status
of the bank drives a wedge between what the leader would
like to do and what she can do. We assume, following exist-
ing literature, that political leaders desire to remain in
power. The claim here is not that independent central
bankers can routinely ignore the policy preferences of
their political principals, but that independence creates
friction in at least one of the mechanisms by which incum-
bents attempt to prolong their tenure.
Clark and Hallerberg (2000) draw on these key macro-
economic insights to explain why political business cycles
occur in some times and places but not others. They theo-
rize and find evidence to support the notion that, when
macroeconomic conditions permit doing so, leaders vigor-
ously manipulate macroeconomic policy instruments in
pre-electoral periods. For instance, when capital mobility is
limited and the central bank is dependent, leaders have
both monetary and fiscal policy at their disposal and, there-
fore, can induce pre-election expansions. In marked con-
trast, when capital is mobile, the exchange rate is allowed
to fluctuate, and the central bank is independent, leaders
have autonomous control over neither policy instrument.
Table 1 summarizes this argument. Each cell of
Table 1 characterizes a different combination of institu-
tional arrangements and identifies the policy tools avail-
able to leaders under that particular set of conditions.
Because leaders can only induce political business cycles
under certain conditions, we expect that only some lead-
ers will, in fact, be able to manipulate monetary or fiscal
policy. In what follows, we test whether leaders having
macroeconomic policy autonomy actually helps them sur-
vive longer in office. According to the PBC literature, we
should find that the presence of particular monetary
institutions will help incumbents retain office, while other
combinations of monetary institutions will not.
Our argument suggests that when capital is mobile,
political survival should be a function of, among other
things, whether the central bank is independent and the
choice of the exchange rate regime. Table 1, for exam-
ple, shows that when capital is mobile, the exchange rate
is flexible, and the central bank is highly independent
(cell f), the incumbent controls neither survival-enhanc-
ing policy instrument. If our argument is correct, a move-
ment away from this condition should increase the
survival chances of the incumbent. For example, it should
be the case that a shift to a dependent central bank
(holding capital mobility and the exchange rate regime
constant, that is, going from from cell f to cell e),
should enhance the survival prospects of the incumbent.















(c) Fiscal policy (d) Fiscal policy
Flexible
exchange
(e) Monetary policy (f) No instruments
1 For example, in a country with a constitutional inter-election period of
4 years, a cabinet that forms immediately after an election and lasts for 3 years
would be coded 0.75, because it had fulfilled 75% of the maximum electoral
term available. If a new cabinet formed and stayed in office for the remaining
year prior to the constitutionally mandated election then that cabinet would
be coded as 1.0 because it would have remained in office for the maximum
amount of time possible. Although the first cabinet lasted three times longer
than the second cabinet, it would be coded as being less durable.
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Similarly, starting again at our baseline case, a change to
a fixed exchange rate (from cell f to cell d) should give
the incumbent newfound power to use fiscal policy to
enhance its survival in office. Finally, a shift from our
base line case that involves both a reduction in central
bank independence and an adoption of a fixed exchange
rate (from cell f to c) also gives the incumbent potentially
survival-enhancing control over fiscal policy, where it pre-
viously had no such control.
We can now state the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: When capital is mobile and the central bank is
independent, incumbents with fixed exchange rates should sur-
vive longer in office (have lower hazard rates) than those with
flexible exchange rates.
Hypothesis 2: When capital is mobile and exchange rates are
flexible, incumbents with dependent central banks should survive
longer in office (have lower hazard rates) than those with inde-
pendent central banks.
One assumption of the argument thus far is that an
important mechanism by which leaders lose office is an
inability to produce the macroeconomic outcomes
needed to ensure their political survival. If this is indeed
the mechanism, then two additional steps in the causal
process should be true. First, incumbents who possess the
tools necessary to manipulate the economy for survival-
maximizing purposes, should do so. Second, voters
should remove leaders who fail to produce the macroeco-
nomic outcomes they desire. There are two large litera-
tures that examine these steps in the causal process: on
the one hand is the literature on political business cycles
and on the other hand is the literature on economic vot-
ing. With respect to the former, Clark and Hallerberg
(2000) and Clark (2003) provide substantial evidence that
leaders will indeed aggressively manipulate whatever
monetary or fiscal policy instruments are available in the
run up to elections. With respect to the latter, numerous
studies identify an association between incumbent vote
share and various macroeconomic indicators (for exam-
ple Duch and Stevenson 2008).
However, because the modal way in which leaders are
removed from office does not involve the ballot box, but
rather occurs through resignation (see Table 2 in the
next section), the literature on economic voting cannot
be uncritically applied here. If our argument is correct,
we should observe a broader connection between the
macroeconomy and the political survival of long-serving
leaders. Specifically, it should be the case that poor mac-
roeconomic conditions ought to place incumbents in
peril of being removed from office, but we are catholic
with respect to the means by which this is accomplished.
Voters may remove leaders who produce economic out-
comes they dislike when given the chance, but party elites
may do the job for them. Determining which mode of
removal will occur is beyond the scope of this study, but
our argument suggests that the economic voting litera-
ture may be flawed in that it mistakes a mechanism of
leader removal for the mechanism of leader removal. Con-
sequently, merely citing studies that show that voters
remove leaders during bad macroeconomic times does
not suffice in establishing our proposed mechanism.
Instead it would be useful to demonstrate the connection
between poor macroeconomic performance and leader
removal.
Hypothesis 3: Increased economic growth reduces the leader’s
risk of being removed from office (reduces the hazard rate).
Research Design
In our analysis, we must measure the amount of time
leaders have been in office and whether those leaders left
office for political reasons. Additionally, we must take
into account the effectiveness of monetary institutions
during the Bretton-Woods era compared to the post-
Bretton Woods era as well as political business cycles.
Finally, we must identify other factors likely to affect the
survival of democratic leaders that we might need to con-
trol for in our empirical analyses. This section details our
operationalization of these variables.
Operationalizing Leader Tenure and ‘‘Political Death’’
To create a dependent variable measuring the tenure in
office of political leaders, we must first identify when
leaders leave office and, second, if their removal can be
classified as a ‘‘political death.’’ Unfortunately, existing
data sets on leader removal, such as the Archigos data set
by Goemans, Skrede Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009), are
not well suited for this purpose. Although the Archigos
data set is extensive, it focuses on evaluating ‘‘irregular’’
causes of leader removal, such as coups and forceful
removal by another state. Consequently, it codes all remo-
vals by the ‘‘prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and
norms of the country’’ as simply ‘‘regular’’ removals
(Goemans et al. 2009:272). However, we need to know
the exact ‘‘regular’’ cause that resulted in the leader’s
loss of office.
Therefore, we create an original data set of leader
removal in 19 OECD countries from 1972 to 1999. We





Leader removal 1972–1999, by type
‘‘Political deaths’’
Lost election 44










End of sample 18
Leader tenure data summary statistics (1972–1999)
Mean tenure (in years) 3.93
Median tenure (in years) 2.49
Minimum tenure (in years) 0.15 (Moore,
New Zealand)
Maximum tenure (in years) 25.7* (Kekkonen,
Finland)
90 percentile (in years) 8.77
75 percentile (in years) 5.07
25 percentile (in years) 1.26
(Notes. Data compiled using Zarate’s Political Collections dataset and Kee-
sing’s Record of World Events.
*Kekkonen had already been in office for 16 years by 1972; only the final
10 years of his term are included in our data.)
558 Political Survival of Democratic Leaders
use the date a leader takes office and the date a leader
leaves office to measure the leader’s tenure. Leaders in
our data set (described in detail later) are fairly evenly
distributed across the six monetary regimes specified in
Table 1.2 The data set identifies whether a leader leaves
office due to a resignation induced by scandal, a resigna-
tion induced by a lack of popularity (and, hence, the
party’s desire to change leadership), a resignation
induced by health concerns, a loss of an election, death
in office, or a term limit. We draw on two sources to con-
struct this data set. First, we obtain a listing of political
leaders, their party, and their dates in office from
Zarate’s Political Collections dataset. Second, each lea-
der’s reason for leaving office is coded with information
from Keesing’s Record of World Events.
Excluding interim leaders (Aoki of Japan in 2000; Zol-
otas of Greece in 1989 ⁄1990; Poher of France in 1974;
Ito of Japan in 1980; and Grivas of Greece in 1989), mili-
tary dictators (Franco of Spain; Papadopoulos and Gizikis
of Greece), monarchs (Constantine II and Paul I of
Greece), and transitional leaders (Juan Carlos of Spain),
we have information on the loss of leadership for 138
leaders in 19 countries over a 28-year period.3
Having constructed this data set, we define ‘‘political
death’’ as when an individual leader leaves office for non-
health-related reasons and was not term-limited. We code
‘‘political death’’ using the following rules. If a leader
resigns or retires for any reason other than declining
health, we code this as a political death. For example,
since Giulio Andreotti resigned as Prime Minister of Italy
in 1992 due to a poor showing by the Christian Democrats
in legislative elections, this is coded as a political death.
However, the resignation of Greek Prime Minister
Andreas Papandreou in 1996 due to declining health is
not coded as a political death. If a leader loses a general
election, we code this as a political death. Hence, despite
serving in office for 16 years, Helmut Kohl is ultimately
coded as a political death as he lost the 1998 German gen-
eral election to Gerhard Schroeder. Although our interest
is in the political life and death of individual leaders, the
fact that some leaders are term-limited presents a chal-
lenge for our definition of political death. Admittedly, as
Table 2 shows, a very small number of leaders in our sam-
ple actually face term limits. Nevertheless, one must think
carefully about how to define political death as it relates
to term-limited leaders. In the analyses that follow, if a lea-
der is term-limited, but that leader’s party loses office in
the succeeding election, this is coded as a political death.
For example, when Ronald Reagan, a Republican, left
office in January 1989, another Republican, George H. W.
Bush, was to be sworn in as the next President. As the
Republican party maintained control of the Presidency,
this is not coded as a political death.4 Our approach to
dealing with term-limited leaders is based on the possibly
heroic assumption that leaders continue to care about
their party’s electoral performance even when they know
they will be stepping down from power themselves. As
robustness tests, we tried other approaches and found that
none changed our results in a substantive way.5
Table 2 provides details of this data.6 The top portion
of Table 2 tabulates the number of leaders from our sam-
ple coded for each reason of ‘‘political death.’’ The larg-
est category is political resignations, comprising nearly
half the sample (65 of 138 leaders). Italy (21) has the
most resignations, followed closely by Japan (14). We
should note that of these resignations, four were related
to scandals (Nixon, USA, 1974; Nakasone, Japan, 1987;
Uno, Japan, 1989; Hosokawa, Japan, 1994) and four were
ostensibly retirements (Sato, Japan, 1972; Karamanlis,
Greece, 1980; Haughey, Ireland, 1992; Carlsson, Sweden,
1996). By treating all resignations not brought on by an
acute illness as political deaths, we are implicitly assuming
that leaders presiding over better macroeconomic condi-
tions would be able to survive scandals and willing to
postpone retirement.
The bottom portion of Table 2 provides descriptive sta-
tistics of the leader tenure data. As the majority of leaders
leave office within the first few years of tenure, becoming
a long-serving leader (in office past 5 years or more) is
rare. However, as we will show, it is this rare breed of
long-serving leaders who benefit most, electorally speak-
ing, from having macroeconomic policy autonomy.7
Operationalizing the Key Explanatory Variables
The key explanatory variables capture the monetary insti-
tutions under which each leader operated. These some-
times vary over the tenure of a particular leader, and our
estimation method allows us to take account of this. Fixed
Exchange Rate is a dichotomous variable based on the
IMF’s Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(various years). Dependent Central Bank equals 1 if the
country’s legal independence measure (Cukierman,
Webb, and Neyapti 1992) is below the sample median.
These measures were taken from Clark (2003).
Operationalizing Capital Mobility
Some scholars, such as Bernhard and Leblang (2002),
operationalize capital mobility with a country-specific vari-
able. Specifically, these scholars use as a proxy for barri-
ers to the movement of assets across borders the
Restrictions on International Transactions compiled by Quinn
(1997). However, we treat capital mobility as a system
level variable and only use the Quinn measure as a
2 The countries in our data set are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United
States.
3 Some leaders had experience with more than one combination of mone-
tary institutions, so the number of leaders associated with each type of institu-
tion do not sum to the number of leaders in the data set. Refer back to the
different combinations of institutions presented in Table 1. Specifically, in our
data cell (c) has 54 leaders (215 leader years), cell (d) has 28 leaders (176 lea-
der years), cell (e) has 39 leaders (143 leader years), and cell (f) has 24 lead-
ers (115 leader years).
4 We do not happen to have examples of term limited leaders whose party
lost power in our sample.
5 For example, one possibility would be to treat term-limited leaders at
the end of their final term as censored. However, one could argue that term
limits are not truly exogenous terminations imposed on leaders; leaders in
such countries know full well that they face a term limit when they enter the
final term. Another possibility would be to add a dummy variable for each
term-limited leader’s final term, to account for the fact that leaders in their
final term might behave differently. Finally, we could re-do our analyses after
dropping the two countries in our sample with term limits (the United States
and Finland). None of these alternate approaches change the results substan-
tially. Results for these additional analyses are available from the authors on
request.
6 The complete data set of leader removal is available from the authors by
request.
7 There is some uncertainty regarding the proper coding of Finland. Spe-
cifically, there is a debate about whether the President should be coded as the
leader of Finland for the entire time frame or whether the leader of Finland
should be coded as the President up to 1981 and the Prime Minister should
be coded as the leader after 1981. We conduct all tests with both codings, and
the results are not altered. Therefore, the results reported here are with the
President coded as the leader of Finland.
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robustness check.8 That is, capital mobility is a feature of
the international system that induces countries to reduce
their barriers, not because doing so increases capital
mobility, but because doing so was simply a recognition
of reality: the ability of governments to effectively control
flows of capital into and out of their countries had been
severely curbed. For this reason, many scholars believe
that the end of the Bretton Woods system accompanied a
structural break in the degree of capital mobility in the
international economy (Webb 1991; Andrews 1994; Clark
2003). We follow suit, by assuming that capital is mobile
for countries from 1972 onward. Some may argue that
the global financial system did not become fully mobile
in 1972, but that this occurred later (in the early 1980s
after the UK and other European nations removed capi-
tal controls). Therefore, we re-estimate the model using
various years between 1972 and 1985 (the latest possible
date by which one could reasonably say the global finan-
cial system was not mobile) to indicate the start of capital
mobility. Doing so does not alter our results.9
Operationalizing Economic Growth
Finally, to test the third hypothesis, we combined our data
on leader survival with yearly data on real GDP growth
taken from Garrett (1998). We have argued that when lead-
ers confront an independent central bank, mobile capital,
and a flexible exchange rate, they will lack the necessary
tools to produce macroeconomic expansions needed to
stave off challenges to their political survival. This test will
allow us to see whether leaders presiding over good eco-
nomic times actually survive longer than those that do not.
Other Factors Affecting the Survival of Democratic Leaders
The general literature on leader survival suggests some
additional factors that may well affect the length of time
a leader is able to stay in power. We might expect that
leaders who participate in multi-party coalitions survive at
different rates than leaders who head single-party major-
ity governments. It is not immediately clear, however,
which arrangement should improve a leader’s tenure. On
the one hand, leaders of single-party majority govern-
ments will have the ability to respond quickly to exoge-
nous shocks and will have little opposition when they
want to use macroeconomic policy instruments for politi-
cal purposes. On the other hand, when things go awry,
voters will find it easier to place the blame on single-party
majorities than parties in large coalitions. Single-party
majority governments, therefore, are more autonomous
in their control of policy, but are also more likely to be
held accountable (Powell 2000).10 Controlling for type of
government is important because scholars have argued
that commitments to central bank independence will lack
credibility when made by single-party majority govern-
ments (Moser 1999; Keefer and Stasavage 2002). We
include a dummy variable indicating whether a single-
party majority controls the government or not. This
variable was coded with data from Woldendorp, Keman
and Budge (2000) and supplemented where necessary
from country reports from the European Journal of Political
Research or media accounts.11
While we have focused on the manipulation of macro-
economic policy instruments by survival-maximizing
incumbents, another possibility is that leaders survive by
judiciously timing elections to take advantage of good
economic times that may be largely outside their control
(Smith 1996; Palmer and Whitten 2000; Kayser 2005). If
leaders ‘‘surf’’ the economy rather than ‘‘manipulate’’ it,
then leaders should survive longer in countries with
endogenous election timing, and their survival should be
unrelated to the monetary institutions that we have iden-
tified as crucial to their ability to manipulate the econ-
omy. Alternatively, it is possible that surfing and
manipulating are substitutes—perhaps leaders are more
likely to surf when they do not have the instruments that
are required to manipulate. Leaders ought to be more
reluctant to adopt monetary institutions that inhibit the
ability to manipulate the economy in systems with exoge-
nously timed elections. Therefore, we control for whether
leaders can easily determine election timing. We rely on
coding by Kayser (2006) to identify ‘‘premier timing’’
cases in our data set. As Kayser (2005:18) notes, of the 19
countries in our data set, only Norway and the United
States ‘‘fully preclude early elections.’’ Neither country
ever has endogenously determined elections, whereas
they can occur in the other countries. However, the abil-
ity of leaders to determine election dates is not equally
unconstrained across the sample of ‘‘endogenous-timing
countries’’ and so we follow Kayser’s practice of dividing
this set of countries into those that have premier timed
and those that do not.12 In our sample, twelve of the
nineteen countries are premier-timing.
Another institutional feature that is likely to influence
leadership survival is the number of electoral districts. The
number of electoral districts captures the degree to which
the legislature is geographically fractionalized. When the
legislature is carved up into many small constituencies, it
may be possible for leaders to use targeted government
spending to increase their survival in office even when
mobile capital and flexible exchange rates render such
spending ineffective in terms of the macroeconomy (Wein-
gast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981; Franzese 2002; Franzese
and Nooruddin 2004). The number of electoral districts
may also influence the choice of exchange rate regime or
degree of central bank independence. To see why, imagine
an incumbent in a system withmany small electoral districts.
When capital is mobile, a fixed exchange rate will allow
8 Specifically, all countries that have a Quinn (1997) Restriction on Interna-
tional Transactions score above the sample’s median value (75 on a 0–100
scale) are treated as having mobile capital. We find the effects of central bank
independence and exchange rate regime to be nearly identical to the results
presented in the text. Replication files for conducting this robustness check
are available upon request.
9 Results from this robustness check are available upon request.
10 We can think of minority governments as de facto coalition govern-
ments, as the government relies on support from opposition parties to remain
in power and pass legislation. But they, arguably, will find it difficult to share
blame for bad outcomes with ‘‘shadow’’ coalition partners. Consequently, one
might think of minority governments as cursed with the worst of both worlds.
They lack both the autonomy to respond quickly that single party majority
governments possess and the ability to share blame with coalition partners
(Powell 2000). However, some scholars have argued that what keeps minority
parties in power is that they are ‘‘strong’’ parties in the sense that there is no
viable alternative to their rule (Laver and Shepsle 1996). In this sense, we
might expect them to have the longest tenure.
11 For the United States, we coded as single-party majority government
those cases in which the president and a majority in both houses of Congress
were controlled by the same party (Laver and Shepsle 1991). For all other
countries in the sample, Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000) explicitly
code government types, indicating whether a government consists of a single-
party majority or not.
12 According to Kayser, the distinction is as follows: ‘‘Premier-timing
requires that the incumbent executive have the de jure and de facto ability to
initiate dissolution and early elections either directly or through a parliamen-
tary majority, whereas the non-premier category includes countries in which
early elections are limited to extraordinary circumstances or election dates are
set by any actor other than the government’’ (Kayser 2006:442).
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targeted fiscal expenditures to also have a broader macro-
economic effect, thus making fixed exchange rates more
attractive. Alternatively, one might think incumbents would
want to complement targeted fiscal expenditures with the
ability to control the broader macroeconomy with monetary
policy, making flexible exchange rates more attractive.
Either way, the choice of exchange rate regime would be
correlated with the number of electoral districts and exclud-
ing this variable from our analysis could bias our results.13
Our measure of geographic fragmentation of the legisla-
ture, the number of electoral districts, is taken from Golder
(2005). As we expect a decreasing marginal effect in the
number of districts, we will use the natural log of the num-
ber of districts rather than the actual number of districts.
The Model and Results
We test our hypotheses using survival (event history) anal-
ysis. The central concept in survival analysis is the hazard
function or hazard rate, h(t). This is the probability that
an event will occur at a particular point in time given that
the event has yet to occur. In terms of the analysis here,
the event in question is the removal of the leader from
office. The hazard rate has two components. The first is a
set of covariates that are hypothesized to systematically
affect the timing of an event. The second is the baseline
hazard function that indicates the rate of event occur-
rence when all the covariates are zero, that is, the base-
line hazard reflects how the rate of event occurrence
changes with time only.
We employ a Cox model with time-varying covariates as
this allows us to estimate the effect of the covariates on the
hazard rate without requiring us to specify a particular
parametric form for the baseline hazard. Recall that our
argument suggests that when capital is mobile, political
survival should be a function of an interaction between
central bank independence and the choice of the
exchange rate regime. Specifically, our model uses the
flexible exchange rate with an independent central bank
as the baseline case. According to our theory, leaders will
possess the ability to control neither monetary nor fiscal
policy under these circumstances. The hazard of being
removed from office, therefore, is at its highest. In
contrast, when a leader confronts a flexible exchange rate
and a dependent central bank she can use monetary policy
for survival-maximizing purposes. Alternatively, when a lea-
der confronts an independent central bank and a fixed
exchange rate, she can use fiscal policy to enhance her
political survival. Consequently, any combination of mone-
tary institutions other than the baseline case should prove
sufficient to reduce the leader’s hazard of removal.
The hazard rate typically has the following form:
hðtjxÞ ¼ h0ðtÞexb where h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate
and xb in our particular case is specified as
Leader Tenure ¼ b1 FixedExchangeRate




An important assumption underpinning use of hazard
models is the proportional hazards assumption, which
holds that the effect of the covariates in the specified
model does not change over time (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004). In our case, however, a test of the Schoen-
feld residuals indicates that the proportional hazards
assumption is violated. Specifically, the chi-squared statis-
tic is 7.96, with a p-value of .047. Thus, we reject the null
hypothesis of no relationship between the residuals and
time.14 Because the proportional hazards assumption is
violated, we must condition the effect of the these
explanatory variables on time (Box-Steffensmeier and
Zorn 2001). Thus, we revise our model of the hazard rate
as follows:
Leader Tenure ¼ b1FixedExchangeRate
þ b2Dependent Central Bank
þb3FixedExchangeRate Dependent Central Bank
þb4FixedExchangeRate Time
þb5Dependent Central Bank Time
þb6FixedExchangeRateDependent Central Bank Time
þbiControls
Now the coefficient on the variable for a dependent
central bank, for example, indicates the effect of low cen-
tral bank independence on leader survival when the lea-
der has just entered office and when the exchange rate is
flexible. Similarly, the coefficient on the variable for a
fixed exchange rate regime tells us the effect of fixed
exchange rates at the beginning of a leader’s term when
the central bank is independent.
Table 3 presents our estimates of this model. Model 1
contains only the key independent variables, while Mod-
els 2–4 each add in one of the control variables. Finally,
Model 5 includes all of the controls in the same model.
Notice that our model specifications do not include the
measure for time by itself. Normally, we would include all
constitutive terms that comprise an interaction term sepa-
rately as well. As the underlying hazard rate is a function
of time, though, doing so would lead to perfect
collinearity.
In all five models, the coefficients indicate the effect of
the covariates on the baseline hazard. A positive coeffi-
cient indicates that the covariate in question increases
the hazard rate or, more intuitively, reduces the length of
a leader’s tenure. Conversely, a negative coefficient
implies that the covariate reduces the hazard rate or
increases the leader’s time in office. Note that the coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms that include Time are all
13 Some readers might wonder whether it is appropriate to control for the
ideological orientation of the government, but we do not believe this is neces-
sary. While partisan orientation of government might be related to the choice
of monetary institutions, we are unaware of a literature that claims that parti-
san orientation influences leader survival.
14 Individual Schoenfeld residual tests are difficult to interpret in this case
because the two key covariates also appear in the interaction term. However,
as both of these key variables are dichotomous, we have the ability to identify
the exact reason behind the rejections of the global test. Specifically, we rerun
the model with dummy variables for the three categories of (i) fixed exchange
rate and a dependent central bank; (ii) fixed exchange rate and an indepen-
dent central bank; and (iii) flexible exchange rate and a dependent central
bank. The final category (flexible exchange rate and an independent central
bank) is treated as the omitted category. Doing this shows that the variable
for fixed exchange rates and a dependent central bank violates the propor-
tional hazards assumption (a chi-squared statistic of 6.12, which is statistically
different from zero at the 0.01 confidence level). This indicates that it is the
interaction of the central bank independence and exchange rate regime vari-
ables that is causing the violation of the proportional hazards assumption. As
both of our key variables, therefore, violate the proportional hazards assump-
tion, we need to interact all three covariates (exchange rate regime; central
bank independence status; and their interaction) with time. None of the indi-
vidual tests of Schoenfeld residuals for our control variables violated the PH
assumption.
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significant, which provides additional evidence that the
proportional hazard assumption is violated (Cleves,
Gould, Gutierrez, and Marchenko 2008:198).
The usefulness of the results in Table 3, however, is
limited due to the interaction terms. As mentioned ear-
lier, the coefficient on Fixed Exchange Rate only tells us
the effect of having a fixed exchange rate regime when
the central bank is independent (that is, Dependent Central
Bank is equal to 0) and when tenure is equal to zero. To
present the results in a more substantively meaningful
way, we graph the percentage change in the hazard rate
associated with a change in our covariates Fixed Exchange
Rate and Dependent Central Bank over time. To calculate
the effect of a change in a covariate in terms of a per-







where X1 and X2 are, respectively, the values of the covari-
ate before and after the change.
Hypothesis 1 states that when capital is mobile and the
central bank is independent, having fixed rather than
flexible exchange rates should decrease a leader’s hazard
rate (increase the leader’s time in office). To evaluate
this hypothesis, given the interaction with time, we need
to calculate the estimated effect of a change in institu-
tions on the hazard rate over a plausible range of the lea-
der’s tenure. For example, in Figure 1, we plot the
percentage change in the hazard rate associated with a
change from a flexible to a fixed exchange rate (given
mobile capital and an independent central bank) from
the third to the fifteenth year in office for the leaders in
our sample.15
In Figures 1 and 2, the solid black line indicates how
the percentage change in the hazard rate associated with
a change in the exchange rate regime changes with the
length of time in office. The 95% confidence intervals
around this line allow us to determine the conditions
under which the estimated difference between flexible
and fixed exchange rate is statistically significant.16 All
other variables are held at their means or modes. The
percentage change in the hazard rate is statistically signif-
icant whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confi-
dence interval are both above (or below) the zero line.
The figure shows that the percentage change in the
hazard rate is negative and significant after a leader has
been in office for 7 years. At this point, leaders under
fixed exchange rate regimes face the reduced hazard of
being removed from office that was anticipated by
Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 states that when capital is mobile and
exchange rates are flexible, incumbents in countries with
dependent central banks should survive longer in office
(have lower hazard rates) than those with independent
central banks. Figure 2 shows that when the exchange
rate is flexible, leaders confronting dependent central
banks face a lower hazard of leaving office than those
confronting an independent central bank when they are
later in their tenure. Specifically, the percentage change
in the hazard rate is negative and significant after a lea-
der has been in office for 7 years. In other words, having
a dependent rather than an independent central bank
(with a flexible exchange rate) has the hypothesized
effect when a leader tries to stay in power beyond her
seventh year in office. This is remarkably similar to the
evidence that we found in support of Hypothesis 1.
While it is important to show that the changes in insti-
tutions relevant to Hypotheses 1 and 2 have statistically
significant effects in the hypothesized directions (for
long-serving leaders), it is also important to determine
whether the magnitude of these estimated effects are sub-

















Dependent variable: tenure of leader (in years)
Fixed exchange rate 2.90 (0.84) *** 2.64 (0.84)*** 2.99 (0.85)*** 2.86 (0.84)*** 2.48 (0.86)***
Dependent central bank 3.39 (0.83)*** 3.19 (0.83)*** 3.38 (0.83)*** 3.40 (0.83)*** 3.17 (0.83)***
Fixed exchange rate · dependent
central bank
)2.56 (0.91)*** )1.78 (0.93)* )2.59 (0.91)*** )2.58 (0.91)*** )1.74 (0.94)*
Fixed exchange rate · tenure )0.57 (0.13)*** )0.51 (0.13)*** )0.57 (0.13)*** )0.57 (0.13)*** )0.52 (0.13)***
Dependent central bank · tenure )0.59 (0.14)*** )0.58 (0.14) *** )0.59 (0.14)*** )0.60 (0.14)*** )0.59 (0.14)***
Fixed exchange rate · dependent
central bank · tenure
0.48 (0.16)*** 0.46 (0.16)*** 0.48 (0.16)*** 0.48 (0.16)*** 0.48 (0.16)***
Premier-timed elections 0.94 (0.28)*** 1.07 (0.29)***
Ln (number of electoral districts) )0.05 (0.07) 0.4 (0.07)
Single-party majority governments )0.11 (0.25) )0.45 (0.26)*
Log likelihood )450.6 )444.5 )450.3 )450.5 )442.9
Observations 654 654 654 654 654
(Notes. Cox proportional hazards estimates; standard errors in parentheses. The Efron method is employed for handling ties. Data are based on 149 leaders from
19 OECD countries between 1972 and 1999.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed).)
15 We plot this period for a couple of reasons. One is that we do not
expect that these tools will make a difference for leaders in the first few years
of their term; they should matter most when survival is more tenuous, which
we expect to be the case later in a leader’s term The other is simply for ease
of presentation; for a couple of the graphs the percentage change is large
(and positive) in the first year of a leader’s term and it makes the relevant
details in the graph more difficult to ascertain.
16 Confidence intervals are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from
the estimated coefficient vector and variance–covariance matrix.
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stantively important. To set a baseline for comparison, we
look at the case where leaders control neither monetary
nor fiscal policy. The hazard rate for leaders in their
seventh year in office in countries with highly indepen-
dent central banks and flexible exchange rates (with all
other variables held at their mean or mode) is 3.42. In
contrast, and consistent with Hypothesis 1, leaders in
countries that are the same in all relevant ways to this
baseline except that they maintain a commitment to fixed
exchange rates (thereby granting leaders effective control
over fiscal policy) are estimated to face a hazard rate less
than half as large (1.22, a 64.3% decrease in the hazard
rate). Similarly, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, leaders
in countries that are the same in all relevant ways to the
baseline case except that central bank independence is
low (thereby granting leaders effective control over mon-
etary policy) are also estimated to a hazard rate less than
half as large (1.38, a 59.6% decrease in the hazard rate)
as the baseline case.
This suggests that from the standpoint of survival-maxi-
mizing leaders who find themselves in the baseline case
where they possess neither the ability to control monetary
policy (because the central bank is independent) nor the
ability to control fiscal policy (because capital is mobile
and the exchange rate is flexible), a reduction in central
bank independence or a switch to a fixed exchange rate
regime is equally effective in accomplishing the goal of
prolonging their tenure in office.17
It should be noted that the results in Figures 1 and 2
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FIG 2. Percentage Change in Hazard Rate when Leader has Dependent Central Bank instead of Independent, when Exchange Rate is Flexible
17 We also have testable implications about cases of low central bank inde-
pendence and fixed exchange rates. If the exchange rate is fixed, we would
expect no significant difference between the hazard rates between leaders in
low central bank independence and high central bank independence coun-
tries. If the central bank is independent, a change from flexible exchange
rates to fixed exchange rates is not expected to have any effect on the leader’s
hazard of being removed from office. We find both expectations hold and
can provide the relevant figures upon request.
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office, central bank dependence, as well as a fixed
exchange rate regime, increases the likelihood of being
expelled from office. We find this a bit surprising but it
might be explained by the fact that incumbents who can
manipulate monetary and fiscal policy for political pur-
poses are more likely to experience the consequences of
their predecessors’ short-sighted policies in the early days
of their tenure. The more interesting result, we think, is
that the hypothesized effects of monetary institutions on
leader tenure seem to kick in only after seven years. In
the discussion section below, we point to some literature
that might shed light on these findings.
Earlier, we expressed concerns that a set of political vari-
ables might be correlated both with leader survival and
the choice of monetary institutions. Models 2–5 in Table 3
are meant to address such concerns. Note that all of the
coefficients connected to monetary institutions are quite
stable across changes in specification. The coefficients for
fixed exchange rates and dependent central bank experi-
ence moderate attenuation when we control for these
other institutional variables, but the coefficients on the
interaction terms are remarkably stable. This suggests that
if we were to create figures like Figures 1 and 2 based on
these alternative specifications, the picture would remain
largely the same. The size of the positive effect of institu-
tional changes would be diminished somewhat and the
point at which these institutions reduce leader’s risk of
removal would occur slightly earlier. But otherwise the
story is the same. This suggests that the specification
shown in Model 5 in Table 3 is not an unreasonable speci-
fication upon which to base our inferences.
It should also be noted that political survival in the
post-Bretton Woods era appears to be influenced by some
of the control variables discussed earlier. Most pro-
nounced is the effect of endogenous elections, although
the direction of the effect may be surprising to some
readers who are familiar with the argument that better
economic performance makes incumbent governments
more likely to call early elections (Palmer and Whitten
2000). Leaders who have the ability to influence when
elections are called are at roughly twice the hazard of
being removed as leaders without the ability to time elec-
tions to take advantage of positive economic shocks. On
the one hand, if we think of manipulation and ‘‘surfing’’
as alternative instruments in a survival-maximizing lea-
der’s arsenal, it is perhaps surprising that leaders with
only one instrument survive longer than those with two.
On the other hand, Smith (1996) presents a model in
which voters punish incumbents who call snap elections
because they infer that incumbents have private informa-
tion that the economy is about to experience a downturn.
This, of course, suggests that incumbents should not, in
equilibrium, call snap elections. But since they sometimes
do, Smith’s model may explain why leaders who have the
legal power to surf may, on average, be at greater risk of
being removed from office than those who do not.
Another possibility is that legislatures in such systems may
have mechanisms for removing leaders that may be
absent in many systems with exogenously timed elections.
Put differently, this result may be due to cabinet instabil-
ity that is unrelated to the management of the econ-
omy.18
Recall that we considered competing arguments
regarding the effect of government type on leader sur-
vival. On the one hand, single-party majority governments
are expected to be capable of acting quickly and deci-
sively in pursuit of survival-maximizing policies. In addi-
tion, some have argued that commitments to central
bank independence will lack credibility if the government
consists of a single-party majority. Both of these factors
suggest that incumbents in countries with single-party
majority governments should face less of a risk of replace-
ment. On the other hand, governments in such circum-
stances will find it harder to share the blame when things
go poorly. The evidence in columns four and five of
Table 3 suggest that the leaders in single-party govern-
ment situations will face hazard rates that are lower than
leaders in countries with other government types. This
might suggest that the ease of policy making and ⁄or the
ability to override nominally independent central banks
may trump the dangers associated with high clarity of
responsibility, but we are reluctant to read too much into
these results because the coefficient in Model 4 was not
significant and the one in Model 5 was only significant at
the 90% confidence level. Finally, we find no evidence of
a relationship between the number of electoral districts
and the hazard rate.
Turning now to the third hypothesis, we examine
whether leaders presiding over good economic times
actually survive longer than those that do not.19 As
before, we interact the key covariate, GDP Growth, with
time. Table 4 presents results from two hazard models
germane to this concern. This table reports estimates
from a hazard model that interacts GDP growth with ten-
ure in office. Our expectation is that increased economic
growth reduces the leader’s risk of being removed from
office.
A figure analogous to Figures 1 and 2—not shown here
for reasons of space—suggests that the data are consistent
with this expectation. Shortly after year three, a 1% point
increase in the growth rate is associated with a decline in
the hazard rate. As the leader’s tenure approaches year
six, this decline becomes statistically significant. The mag-
nitude of this change is also substantively important. By
year seven, a one percentage point increase in the growth
rate is associated with a 26.2% decline in the hazard rate.
Interestingly, this is very close to the estimated effect of
the onset of an election when the exchange rate is flexi-
ble and the central bank is dependent or when the
exchange rate is fixed and capital is fully mobile (see
Clark 2003:163, 164).
Note also that GDP growth appears to influence leader
survival at roughly the same point in a leader’s tenure
that we found the ability to manipulate monetary or fiscal
policy to be felicitous for leader survival. Good economic
performance appears to buoy leader survival starting in
year six, and the survival enhancing effects of control
over monetary and fiscal policy are statistically discernible
at about year seven. Thus, the ability to manipulate the
macroeconomy helps leaders only at the point in their
tenure where poor macroeconomic performance has an
appreciable affect on leader survival.
18 If our goal was to assess the effects of premier-timed elections on politi-
cal survival, however, we might have wished to control for other factors that
are correlated with premier-timed elections that might also effect survival.
19 Previous work suggests that leaders presiding over good economic times
will call early elections if they have the ability to do so (Palmer and Whitten
2000). The assumption is that these leaders are subsequently rewarded at the
polls. Our analysis tells us whether leaders who enjoy endogenous election
timing stay in power longer than those who do not, as well as whether this
benefit holds when leaders’ terms do not always end with elections.
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Discussion: Why Long-Serving Leaders?
It is clear that context matters—not all leaders have the
ability to manipulate the economy (Clark and Hallerberg
2000), and not all leaders have the incentive to do so at
all times (Schultz 1995). The above results are striking,
though, in that they suggest another contextual feature
that plays a role, namely length of time in power.
Economic performance, and the ability to manipulate
macroeconomic policy, matters for long-serving leaders
but does not have an effect prior to the eighth year in
office. Stated differently, we find that having the ability to
manipulate the economy could only enhance the survival
of the 24 leaders (comprising 114 of 649 leader years) in
our sample who were in office seven or more years. That
such a low number of leaders’ survival can be enhanced
by possessing the tools of macroeconomic policy actually
makes our finding even more important—this shows that
what the conventional wisdom suggests should benefit all
(or, at least, most) leaders, actually benefits very few.
But why would long-serving leaders be especially
vulnerable? It is beyond the scope of the study to fully
engage this question. However, we wish to offer in this
section some possible motivational and structural expla-
nations that can be subjected to proper testing at a later
time.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that leaders may be most
motivated to manipulate the economy late in their ten-
ures in response to the accusation of stale policies. For
example, the biggest challenge facing Margaret Thatcher
prior to her 1987 re-election was to continually rebut
‘‘anyone [who] hoped to attack the Conservative Party
for running out of ideas after two periods of office.’’20
Similarly, in a key debate prior to the 1993 legislative
elections, the chief Spanish opposition rival, Jose Marie
Anzar Lopez, leveled the following accusation against the
long-serving Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez;
‘‘you have lost the confidence of the nation and your
government has run out of ideas.’’21 During the cam-
paign prior to the election that eventually ended Helmut
Kohl’s 16-year tenure as German Chancellor, The Econo-
mist magazine editorialized that change was needed
because, quite simply, Kohl was ‘‘out of ideas.’’22 What
can long-serving leaders do to counter the accusation of
having ‘‘run out of ideas,’’ particularly when their long
tenures mean such claims might actually be true? In
short, although leaders may attempt to reposition their
party or unveil new policies, it appears that these leaders
are the most likely to resort to inducing political business
cycles.
Systematic evidence also suggests that long-serving lead-
ers face great (if not the greatest) difficulty in retaining
office. Focusing on American presidential elections, Abra-
mowitz (2004:274) includes in his ‘‘time for a change’’
model of presidential elections a variable capturing
whether the current president’s party has been in office
for more than one term. Using data on all Presidential
elections from 1948 to 2000, Abramowitz finds that the
president’s party being in office for more than one term
has a statistically significant negative impact on the
incumbent vote share in the next election. As Abramowitz
(1988:844) states, ‘‘the candidate of the incumbent party
will do worse if his party has controlled the White House
for 8 years or longer: the longer a party has been in
power, the more likely the public is to feel that ‘it’s time
for a change’.’’
Other scholars, while agreeing that incumbents do pay
a ‘‘cost of ruling’’,23 are less convinced by the hypothesis
that this is caused because ‘‘voters have a taste for
change’’ (Paldam and Skott 1995:160). As Paldam and
Skott (1995) state, ‘‘It is a common hypothesis in popular
writings that from time to time voters want to see new
faces...[but] this hypothesis is hard to prove or disprove’’
(Paldam and Skott 1995:160). Thus, Paldam and Skott
(1995) essentially dismiss this argument when explaining
the cost of voting. Similarly, in his book-length study of
government duration, Warwick (1994:104) only briefly
alludes to the possibility of voters wanting something
new, before turning to other factors: ‘‘it may be the case
that the sources of the rising hazard lie with factors that
are unmeasured, perhaps inherently unmeasurable: a
gradual disillusionment among government ranks that
comes with policy errors or failures, a general tendency
for the popularity of governments to decline over time,
and the like.’’ Stevenson (2002:157, 158) presents an
explanation for the cost of ruling that ignores the notion
of a ‘‘taste for change’’ altogether, although he clearly
says that it is a ‘‘well established empirical fact: that the
longer an incumbent government has been in power, the
more votes it loses.’’ Note that this is not simply a refer-
ence to a cost of being in power, but a statement about
how this cost grows over time: ‘‘the size of the negative
incumbency effect tends to increase with the length of
time the incumbent cabinet has been in power’’ (Steven-
son 2002:158). Although we are looking at the leaders,
not cabinets per se, Stevenson’s finding is consistent with
our own finding: the leaders that Stevenson would expect
to be most susceptible to losing votes are also the ones
most likely to benefit from the ability to induce political
business cycles.
Although such ‘‘long-serving leaders’’ may have the
greatest incentive to induce political business cycles, there
may also be structural reasons that explain why they expe-
rience the greatest benefit from the ability to induce
political business cycles. Consider a series of hypothetical
leaders, each removed from office at different times of
their tenure (some early, some late). First, leaders who
are removed from office in their first year are not likely
TABLE 4. The Effect of Economic Growth on Survival Time in the
post-Bretton Woods Era
Independent Variables Main Model
Dependent variable: tenure of leader (in years)
GDP growth rate 0.286 (0.121)**
GDP growth · tenure )0.094 (0.034)***
Log likelihood )179.8
Observations (leaders) 266
(Notes. Cox proportional hazards estimates; standard errors in parentheses.
The Efron method is employed for handling ties. Data are based on leaders
from 19 OECD countries between 1972 and 1999.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed).)
20 Quoted from speech to unveiling the Conservative party’s manifesto
(Time magazine, June 1, 1987).
21 ‘‘Gonzalez wins by default in lackluster clash.’’ The Independent (London),
June 2, 1993. p. 10.
22 ‘‘Chancellor Schro¨der?’’ The Economist, March 7, 1998, p. 15.
23 Many scholars have found evidence suggesting that incumbents lose
votes. For a small selection of literature showing evidence of the negative
incumbency hypothesis, see, for example, Rose and Mackie (1983), Strøm
(1985), Palmer and Whitten (1999), or Narud and Valen (2008).
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to have been able to propose, let alone enact and imple-
ment, a change in macroeconomic policy. Second, given
the time lag between the implementation of expansionary
fiscal or monetary policy and its real effect on the econ-
omy, it is unlikely that a leader removed in their second
or third year in office would have the ability to manipu-
late the economy in such a way as to induce favorable
voter sentiment.24 Moreover, leaders in the early years of
their tenure are able to blame difficult economic times
on the policies of their predecessors; thereby eliminating
a need to manipulate the economy solely for political
gain.
But what about leaders who are beyond these initial
years of tenure? These leaders are not in a post-election
‘‘honeymoon’’ period and, most likely, are now
approaching an election (either because it is on a fixed
cycle, as in the United States, or because they are reach-
ing the maximum length of time between elections, as in
the United Kingdom). Thus, it is leaders beyond their
first three or 4 years in office who would be most likely
to have both the ability and the incentive to pull the
levers of monetary and fiscal policy.
Conclusion
We present robust evidence that when political leaders
lack control of either monetary or fiscal policy, they stand
a higher risk of being removed from office when they
have been in office for at least 7 years. In addition, we
present evidence that only leaders who stay in office for
at least 6 years appear to be imperiled by economic down-
turns. Effective manipulation appears to occur only when
incumbents have the means and the motive and are suffi-
ciently vulnerable due to the costs of holding office.
There is a large literature on economic voting that sug-
gests that incumbents presiding over economic down-
turns are more likely to be removed from office by
retrospective voters than incumbents in power during
favorable economic times. The literature on political busi-
ness cycles suggests that the threat of suffering such a
fate induces incumbents to engineer macroeconomic
expansions during pre-electoral periods. The current
study suggests that the literatures connected by the above
logic both understate and over-generalize the link
between economics and politics. They understate the link
between economics and politics because elections are
only one way in which unpopular leaders are removed
from office in democracies. In fact, in our sample, more
leaders leave office through resignation than by losing
elections. This may explain why, in the words of an influ-
ential scholar of economic voting, ‘‘economic effects on
election outcomes do not qualify as a ‘robust fact’ about
elections’’ (Anderson 2007:286). Indeed, Grafstrom
(2011) shows that only a tiny fraction of models estimat-
ing the conditional effect of economic outcomes on
incumbent vote shares produce correctly signed, statisti-
cally significant coefficients. Could it be that the macro
evidence for economic voting is virtually non-existent
because this literature has mistaken one mechanism by
which poor performing leaders are removed from office
for the mechanism of leader removal? Losing an election
is not even the modal way in which leaders are removed
from office, so while losing an election is sufficient for
being removed from power, it is clearly not necessary.
Consequently, existing tests of the economic voting
hypothesis constitute a misspecified attempt to test the
broader hypothesis that political survival is imperiled by
poor macroeconomic outcomes. As a result, doubt has
been cast, prematurely we think, on the operation of
mechanisms of accountability in advanced industrial
democracies. We have not provided an adequate test of
this broader argument, but hope the results on the link
between economic growth and political survival are sug-
gestive of the way forward.
The existing literatures may over-generalize the link
between economics and politics in two ways. First, while
all leaders are at risk of being removed from office dur-
ing economic hard times late in their tenure, not all lead-
ers possess the macroeconomic policy instruments that
would allow them to try to stave off hard times. Second,
it appears that the state of the economy has a pro-
nounced effect on the incumbent’s survival chances only
when incumbents have been in power for some time.
The desire to manipulate the economy may be necessary,
but it is not sufficient. Long-lived leaders with control of
neither monetary nor fiscal policy are stuck between a
rock and a hard place and, therefore, run a higher risk
of being removed from office. Our results suggest that
leaders who use these tools too early, though, will not
help themselves either.
One consequence of this predicament is that leaders
who are vulnerable due to a long term in office and who
lack access to monetary institutions that would allow
them to manipulate the economy may be more apt to
cast about for riskier ways to prolong their political lives.
For example, if leaders benefit from a ‘‘rally around the
flag effect’’, they might be particularly tempted to engage
in diversionary foreign policy acts late in their terms if
they lack the capacity to manipulate the macroeconomy.
As it is plausible that leaders might have a hierarchy of
survival-maximizing strategies, it is plausible they would
engage in macroeconomic manipulation if that option is
available and diversionary war only when it is not. This
context conditionality may explain why unconditional
tests of the diversionary war hypothesis have produced
contradictory results.
Together, the above observations suggest that the lead-
ers face an increased risk of being removed from office
for poor economic policy performance independent of
the onset of elections. Consequently, leaders in ‘‘premier-
timed’’ systems are not likely to be content to ‘‘surf’’ on
exogenously determined economic waves. They too have
incentives to manipulate the economy. It is, therefore,
significant that the results reported in this study are
drawn from a sample in which very few countries have
entirely fixed electoral calendars.
Interestingly, the combination of institutions that
leaves incumbents without the ability to manipulate the
macroeconomy for their political survival (independent
central bank, mobile capital, and flexible exchange rates)
is precisely the set of institutions frequently trumpeted by
international financial institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. It is not surprising that the Fund
would like member countries to adopt institutions that
make it difficult for economic policy to be used for politi-
cal purposes, but our results imply that survival-maximiz-
ing leaders would have reasons to be reluctant to adopt
such institutions.
24 The possibility of fiscal foresight, in which economic actors change
behavior in response to a known change in tax policy, is discussed extensively
by Leeper, Walker & Yang (2009). However, voters at large may still adopt a
‘‘believe it when I feel it’’ approach, that is, they must have directly received
the benefits from the change in policy before it can induce a change in voting
behavior.
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